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TRANSCRIPTS

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE FBI, JAMES BAKER,
IN CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR MARY
DEROSA ON THE FBI AND INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE*
Mary DeRosa (MD): Thank you, and I want to thank Jim Baker very
much for coming here. We have worked together and known each
other for many years. He is a remarkable lawyer and public servant, and
we are really, very lucky to hear from you today. What we thought we’d
do is go into depth on some particular issues that the FBI is engaged in
internationally, and I’ll ask Jim some questions, and at the end, we’re
going to leave a little time to open it up for questions, so you can think
about your questions, but if the question you are thinking about has
something to do with Hillary Clinton’s emails, or investigations into
Russian activities in the election, then probably you ought to think
about another question, because, for obvious reasons, Jim is not going
to be able to talk about those issues. But there is a lot he can talk about.
I thought maybe we could start with just a little background. People
are very familiar I think with what the FBI does domestically and its
presence and role domestically, maybe less so with the FBI’s overseas
responsibilities and footprint, so maybe you can give us some of that
background to start off.
James Baker (JB): Sure. Mary, it’s great to see you again and thank
you for this opportunity, Shannon, and the whole Journal, thank you
for this opportunity. The FBI is mainly focused on the United States,
protecting the United States from a range of threats both domestic and
foreign, and on also enforcing the criminal law of the United States.
And so, in order to do that, we inevitably have to be international in
scope as well. So, to think about it correctly, there are two buckets I
would put our work in. One is, our operational folks that people might
be familiar with—counterterrorism in particular, but criminal, counterin
telligence, the whole nine yards, really everything that we do—is inevitably
to some degree international in its scope because of the way that the
perpetrators operate, the threats, and the threat vectors. Hopefully we’ll
also talk about cyber security in detail. So that’s the operational way we
deal with the international world and I can dive into that in a second.
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Then we also have a dedicated cadre of folks who focus almost
exclusively on international operations. It’s called the international
operations division, helpfully. We have about 400 people and about 300
of them are overseas. About 100 or so, 150 or so are located at
headquarters or in the United States. So the folks overseas are referred
to as legal attaches, and they are at Embassies. We have, I think,
sixty-three legal attaché ofﬁces around the world and another twentyﬁve or so sub-ofﬁces in different locations. They have responsibility for
covering, in one way or another, about 200 countries. We have folks all
over the world dealing with international interactions.
What they do is coordinate and consult with our international
partners—with U.S. government folks at Embassies ﬁrst, and then also
with our international partners. They’re trying to assist in joint investi
gations that we might be running with the foreign partner and with
coordinating evidence requests back and forth. We might need evi
dence from a foreign country and they might need evidence from the
United States, so we work on that.
A substantial part of what they do is training. They are over there
training folks in what we do and how we do it. Folks are very interested
in how the FBI goes about its investigations.
MD: So foreign law enforcement?
JB: We are training foreign law enforcement. Sometimes they’re very
interested in U.S. law, and we’ll train on that. But they’re also inter
ested in FBI techniques: investigative techniques; investigative method
ology; how we go about conducting oversight; management oversight
of our activities; how we deal with technology issues and things like
that. We do substantial training in-country, if you will. We also then
have, at the FBI academy down at Quantico, something we call the
“National Academy.” It’s a rather lengthy course where folks from
around the United States, state and local law enforcement, as well as
from foreign countries, come to Quantico and spend signiﬁcant time at
the FBI, at the Academy, going through a range of courses covering
how we go about our business, how U.S. law enforcement works, how
U.S. legal structures work, and so on. This is highly sought after by state
and local authorities, as well as our foreign partners. This is a big deal
and it is crucial in terms of building the relationships overseas that then
help us do our jobs. As you can imagine, really in any line of work,
having effective business relationships is critically important to being
successful over the long term. So that’s what they focus on.
We operate in an international environment on very case-speciﬁc
things: pursuing the bad guys overseas, trying to get evidence, coordi
nating to make sure that something bad doesn’t happen overseas,
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protecting our allies from a threat or protecting a U.S. facility overseas
from a threat. Then we’ve also got this longer term deep international
presence. Just for the law students in the room, in terms of dealing
with, and thinking about, the international environment you end up
focusing on public international law— customary international law,
treaties, these kinds of things—and thinking about the legal structure
in that way. But that is a somewhat narrow, in terms of the number of
person hours spent on that by lawyers and people around the world,
small subset of what happens internationally, so to speak. All this other
stuff is happening at the FBI and at other government agencies. For
those of you who are interested in this kind of thing from a career
perspective, you should think more broadly about international law.
The State Department is great and the Legal Advisor’s Ofﬁce at the
State Department is great, but that’s not the only game in town, in
terms of thinking about working in international matters. There are a
lot of opportunities beyond the State Department.
MD: So, in the U.S. Government, you can think more broadly. For
example, the Justice Department also has a lot of presence outside the
country.
With that background, you have over your career, spent a lot of time
working on cyber issues and it has been a major and increasing focus of
the FBI over the last ﬁfteen or twenty years. Now it is a very signiﬁcant
focus and it is, by its nature, very international. Maybe you can talk
more about this. Many of the perpetrators of cybercrime in the United
States are located overseas, but even if they’re located here, the nature
of the internet means that investigations would likely be international.
Maybe you could talk about the way the FBI handles cyber investiga
tions: what are the challenges? And in what way does the unusually
international quality of cybercrime maybe complicate or challenge the
investigations of those issues. You can start wherever you want, but I
think the beginning, the number one issue, in an investigation is who
did it, and even that in the cyber area is very complicated. Maybe you
can start there and talk about that aspect of cyber investigation.
JB: Sure. I’ll just start, and then pull me back and guide me in a
different direction if I go off on some tangent. There is no doubt that
cyber is international. And any person working in that area, regardless
of where you are—at the FBI, another part of the government or in the
private sector—if you’re not thinking about it in terms of its interna
tional aspects, you really don’t understand it, you don’t get it, and
you’re not going to be able to deal with it. That’s the main thing.
Cyber is international and international is cyber. And I’m kind of
ﬂipping those around in the sense that in cyber people think about it
2017]

897

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

perhaps too narrowly in the sense of intrusions and intrusion protec
tions and so on, but it makes sense if you really think more broadly
about the role of technology today in society, and how we cannot
operate really without engaging with technology in a signiﬁcant way.
And so I think it’s important to understand that fact. It’s important to
understand it both in terms of the threat, then what the threat actors
are thinking about, and how they’re thinking about us, the potential
victims. I read something recently that I thought was quite interesting
that—I can’t remember who said this, so I apologize to the source of
it—the most useful human tool today is the smartphone. It’s not a
hammer or chisel or anything else that we can think of. It’s a smart
phone because that’s what so many people have and they use it to such
a signiﬁcant degree. Well that presents all kinds of risks, and a lot of
those risks are posed by international folks.
But in terms of dealing with this “whodunit” kind of thing, I would
say we have to approach how we go about our investigation with an
open mind. In the cyber environment, it is not a simple question to
answer. Sometimes it’s easy but many times it’s not.
One of the particular problems that I’m trying to focus on is the
attribution question—that is and has been a key problem and we can
spend a lot of time talking about here today in the cyber area. And I
guess I would say that attribution—it’s an art. It’s an art as much as a
science. And it requires analysis and data and facts. And that you have
to understand the technology in order to be able to understand the
facts correctly. The facts can lead you to an identiﬁcation, but you have
to think deeply about those facts and understand them, and that
requires a careful analysis, so we really try to do that effectively. I would
say that we as a government, a federal government, are getting better,
increasingly, about attribution, and using the tools available to us. The
issue is that the adversaries are also getting better about obscuring the
nature and scope of their activities and their location. So, I don’t know
if that’s a chicken and egg problem, or if that’s a cat and mouse
problem, or just an escalating problem, but, those two things are
happening simultaneously, so that presents challenging issues.
MD: So, maybe just, back up a little and talk a little about why
attribution is so much more difﬁcult. And when you say the FBI or the
government is getting better, is it getting better technically at tracing
back, or are there other aspects to understanding and improving
attribution?
JB: I would say we’re increasingly better technologically. We are
increasingly better with our analysis of the technology and what it
means. You have to really be knowledgeable about these networks:
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understand what is happening, what a particular piece of data means in
terms of how a network has routed material, and the forensic footprint
of the data. That does require specialization, and we have more people
who are better at it, therefore we’re getting better at it. That’s one way
to think about it.
It is both technology and analytical rigor and skill that enables you to
better ﬁgure out what’s happening. And as I say, at the same time the
bad guys know this is a problem, they know this is hard for us, and they
want to make it even harder. They are doing whatever they can,
especially focusing on obscuring the metadata or the data about data
(the bread crumbs if you will) that are associated with their communi
cations. They are trying like heck to obscure that, even to a greater
degree, than exists inherently within the networks. Inherently, there
are challenges with respect to attribution because of how communica
tions are routed for lawful reasons by legitimate companies, and then if
you layer on top of that some of the techniques that adversaries use, it’s
even harder. Then you layer on top of that encryption, and we have a
whole other ball of wax. We’ll come back to that.
MD: We deﬁnitely want to get to encryption. I read something very
recently about a number of cyber criminals, cyber actors who are now
pretending to be Russian because there is so much attention paid to
Russian hackers. You’re seeing a lot of—and people have been able to
identify—Russian code that looks like it has gone through a translation
app, so maybe that’s an example—when you say they are trying to mask,
hide and trying to misdirect. There are very creative criminals.
JB: It’s extremely creative. So, it depends on their purpose, where
they are, what they’re trying to do, and how they’re trying to fake us
out. Sometimes they’ll pretend to be from particular foreign countries
and do things—without getting into too much detail—to make them
selves look like they’re coming from that particular location in a deeper
way than just an IP address that happens to show up from a foreign
country. They try to really look like they are coming from that location.
But then also, we have the problem of foreign actors trying to look like
they are coming from the United States, for a variety of reasons. One
reason is because we have good infrastructure here, and they want to
piggy back off of that. But secondly, they know a lot about U.S. laws and
they know what restrictions are going to apply inside the United States.
They want to take advantage of that to slow us down. Even if at the end
of the day if we ultimately ﬁgure out where they were at the time of
their intrusion activities, they might be gone by that point, so if they can
just slow us down, knowing that eventually we might catch up to where
they were, they think they’ll be gone from there by a certain point. It’s
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both things—they sometimes want to look like they’re overseas, they
sometimes want to look like they’re here.
MD: Interesting. When we talk about different cybercrimes or differ
ent aspects of cybercrime, what are the different kinds of international
actors engaging in the same sort of techniques maybe, but for different
purposes. Can you talk a little about who those actors are, and maybe
what some of the differences are? Does who it is make a difference in
how you have to deal with them?
JB: Sure. So it’s nation-states that are highly technically advanced in
many instances. They are very well-resourced both from a technological
perspective as well as from a human resource perspective. They have
lots of people they can throw at a problem. I can come back to that in a
second. Transnational criminal organizations are mostly interested in
money. The nation-states are interested in a range of different things,
in particular they are interested in information, both about U.S.
government ofﬁcials and U.S. government classiﬁed information. The
type of thing that you would think of as more classical espionage. But
then they are stealing personally identiﬁable information about Ameri
cans and stealing it with a long-term perspective in mind as they
monitor who we are, what we do, and where we move. They plot out
where they are going to take advantage of that information. And they
also steal economic data that is beneﬁcial to them and their companies.
In addition to then embedding themselves in a persistent way in our
networks to continue their espionage activities. They are then poten
tially positioning themselves to actually take something more character
istic of a cyber-attack in the future, should that be necessary. They are
very well resourced and robust in terms of the threat that they pose.
Aside from focusing on money, transnational criminal organizations
after money are also, in many instances, highly sophisticated, danger
ous, and they might cause wreckage inadvertently. So, that’s a potential
problem. Terrorist organizations are also a threat, both in the physical
world as well as in the cyber world. Then you have different types of
criminals, in smaller groups, that you might consider organized crime
but not on the scale that I was talking about a second ago. Individual
hackers that are after something. And then you have other types of
organizations that aren’t interested in damage, destruction, or in
stealing money, but for whatever reason, they want to disrupt the
operation of a network or a website, or take command of some type of
thing. So they potentially pose threats as well.
Did I answer your question?
MD: You did, yes. I don’t know what’s gotten the most attention, but
there has certainly been a lot of attention on state actor hacks and
900
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“attacks” in a non-legal sense. I’m thinking, for example, of North
Korea and the Sony incident, Iran and the U.S. ﬁnancial sector. With
Sony, Iran, and China’s economic espionage, the FBI and the U.S.
government have gone public with their attribution assessments. Maybe
you can talk about the process there and some of the challenges that
present when you are actually dealing with an investigation of a state
actor.
JB: Because of the FBI’s role as a national security entity, with both
national security authorities as well as law enforcement authorities, we
can look at a problem from a 360-degree perspective and try to ﬁgure
out the right, or best, way to thwart or disrupt the activities of the
nefarious actor, as well as bring them to justice. We know that it’s not
always the case that you’re going to have something wrapped up in a
nice prosecution: you bring somebody to the United States, you put
them in a federal court, you try them, convict them, and send them to
jail.
That happens, but it doesn’t always happen, and we’ve gotten our
minds around that, especially over the last sixteen years with respect to
terrorism cases. We know that there are going to be other outcomes
aside from just arresting somebody and putting them in jail here in the
United States. I think we try to look at these threats from that 360
degree perspective. If the nefarious actor is a nation state, you’re not
going to put a nation state in jail. You can put individual actors in jail if
you can ﬁgure out who those are, and I’ll come back to that if I can. The
question is: how do you disrupt these activities and how do you deter
future activities like that? One way is to go public with attribution. With
respect to that process, at a high level, we want to make sure we were
right. We want to make sure that we’ve done rigorous analysis of the
facts, that we’re highly conﬁdent in the attribution that we are going to
make publically. That’s number one.
Number two is that we want to make sure that we have coordinated or
de-conﬂicted with other entities in the U.S. government and perhaps
with our foreign partners to make sure that they don’t have some
interest that would be damaged by making this information public. You
do increase the risk of public disclosures about how you determined
that it was country X, and we have to be prepared to deal with that.
You’re going to get a million FOIA requests for this kind of informa
tion, so you want to make sure that you’ve thought through all the risks
and beneﬁts of the attribution. But then, that may be the way to go
about doing it. The attribution problem is—and I’m not an interna
tional lawyer by training or by trade currently— one of the things that
inhibits the development of international legal norms with respect to
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cyber activities. It’s this idea that countries have that they can basically
get away with it, and they don’t have to conform to the norm because
they can sneak around it. The norm doesn’t get developed and doesn’t
have the effect that legal norms that have developed over the years have
internationally because you can see that it’s a state actor driving a ship
through a particular location.
MD: I’m not aware of the U.S. government having actually identiﬁed
a state actor as a cyber actor up until a few years ago, and recently there
have been quite a few. Is that a movement on the part of the Govern
ment, the FBI, and others, to recognize that the other way wasn’t
working and we need to be more public about it?
JB: I guess I would say I think we’ve gained more experience dealing
with the problem, and the limitations on the tools that are available to
us to thwart the activities, and so, again, it’s sort of a risk-beneﬁt analysis
to try to deal with these countries and not let them get away with it.
To try to hold them accountable, knowing that there is a certain
amount of risk involved. Then also knowing that there are risks
involved in not doing something to protect our people, our facilities,
our information.
I think we’re gaining more experience and willing to try different
things. If we think we can indict a foreign government ofﬁcial because
we have the evidence, and we think that would make sense, then we’ll
do that. If we think attribution is the thing to do, we’ll do that. If it turns
out that there’s some equity out there that the intelligence community
has, for example, that militates against making an attribution public,
then we’ll hold off. I think we’re evolving our thinking about the range
of options available to us and trying to be very thoughtful, but also
aggressive when dealing with what is a very aggressive threat coming at
us.
MD: Just to wrap up on the cyber issue and lead us into the
encryption issue: the investigation of cybercrime and cyber activities
very much involves the private sector, and the private sector is, for the
most part, the victim of a lot of these cyber activities. How do you see
the FBI interacting with the private sector, and what are some of the
challenges there? How do you work with the private sector to try to
make sure that it’s an effective relationship?
JB: We think of companies that have been victimized as victims, and
we approach them on that basis. The FBI is very used to dealing with
victims of a whole range of terrible crimes. We have a lot of tools that we
can bring to bear to try to deal with what may be a persistent ongoing
threat, or to help them understand what happened and to ultimately
bring the people who are responsible for this to justice, if possible, or at
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least call them out or deter them from further activities. Companies are
often weary of dealing with us in the cyber realm, there is no doubt
about that. I understand that, having been in the private sector a
couple of different times, I get that. You lose a certain amount of
control when you start to bring the federal government into it.
I think, however, that we’ve been effective in developing ways to
protect their data. If we have to do some examination of some part of
their data or their network in connection with the investigation a) we
care a lot about getting it right and b) I think we’ve come up with ways
to actually be effective in protecting the data from exposure either in
court, in a proceeding, through FOIA, or through criminal discovery.
Obviously if you end up with a defendant, the defendant’s rights have
to be protected as well. Trying to ﬁgure out that balance is critically
important to us. But we care a lot about it and we care a lot about
getting it right.
I guess, to ﬂip it around a little bit, I think companies also are
sometimes hesitant to come to us and expose that they have been
victimized. They don’t want that to become public for a lot of different
reasons. Perhaps for reputational reasons, or because competitors who
might take advantage of them. What I would add though is in that there
are many great companies out there who offer cyber security services to
protect them and to do forensic evaluations, and so on. It’s important
to remember that in many instances a company is dealing with a
nation-state on the other side that is trying to victimize them. That, as I
said before, is well-resourced, highly technically advanced and persis
tent, and can be there for the long term.
The question is: are you, as a corporation, able to fend off a
nation-state? Is that really what you’re capable of doing? Even though
you might hire some great companies collectively, are you really able to
do that without assistance in some way from the federal government, from
the FBI, from DHS, etc.? I would urge people to think carefully about
that and to not be overconﬁdent, frankly, in their ability to do that.
And as an aside, if you are a corporate leader and you are not focused
on cyber, you are missing the boat. It is critically important in a whole
range of ways to your effective operation as a company, and perhaps
your existence as a company. Not only are people stealing things like
intellectual property, and have been for a long time, we increasingly see
the ransomware threat, where these malicious actors will ﬁnd some way
to tie up your networks, tie up your data so you can’t access or use it and
you have to pay them a ransom in order to free it up. Even if you pay it,
how conﬁdent are you that they’re not still there doing whatever they
want to do.
2017]
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MD: It’s hard to imagine, given everything that’s been out there in
the last ﬁve or so years, that there are corporate leaders that aren’t
focusing on cyber. Is that something you still see? Has that improved or
do you still think there’s a challenge there?
JB: I think there’s a challenge there. I think it has improved but I still
think there is a challenge there. People, such as executives, are too
willing to delegate to cybersecurity folks without themselves spending
enough time developing a sufﬁcient level of understanding of what’s
happening to execute their ﬁduciary responsibilities to the company. I
think that’s an issue. I think people need to focus on that.
Also, just for lawyers, my two-cents to the law students in the audience
is sort of similar: I don’t really care what part of the law you are
interested in, if you are not focused on understanding technology and
cyber to a degree of proﬁciency, you are going to be left behind. You
are not going to be an effective lawyer in today’s environment and you
are going to increasingly be left behind in your legal career because it
infuses so many different parts of the world. You continually bump into
it from a legal perspective, whether you are in the government or
whether you’re in the private sector. You need to understand tech to a
signiﬁcant degree.
MD: I teach a cyber class here and I always have a similar message
because I think you are absolutely right. I have deﬁnitely seen in my
time and practice that there is a tendency with cyber issues or other
technology related issues, for senior people to say “oh, that’s tech, I
don’t get that,” “that’s cyber, I don’t get that,” and turn it over to
experts. And these are lawyers and policymakers, and therefore the law
and the policy hasn’t developed in as healthy a way as it otherwise
could. What I say to my students is, don’t be scared by the technology.
There is a lot that you can understand about how all of this works. And
you can work on these issues without being a computer science PhD. I
completely agree that if you aren’t comfortable with these issues, a lot
of the law is going to leave you behind.
Continuing with technology issues, obviously a lot of attention last
year after the San Bernardino attack, and the FBI’s attempts to get
information from the perpetrator’s iPhone, and that brought this issue
of the proliferation of strong encryption and its impact on law enforce
ment and national security investigations to public attention. I’d like to
ﬁrst get your explanation of this issue, for people who’ve heard about it
but are not completely familiar, and then I’d like you to solve it.
JB: OK, so, we’ve talked about the going dark problem, which many
people have derided as a name, but that’s what we’ve called it. Going
dark, it is essentially the inability of the FBI— or federal, state, local law
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enforcement as well as the intelligence community—to obtain, with
appropriate legal process, the evidence or information that the law
would otherwise entitle us to obtain because of some technological
reason. That’s really what it’s all about—we can’t get the information
because of the application of technology. Encryption is one subset of
that, so I’ll just talk about encryption. I’ve said it before and I’ll keep
saying it: the FBI supports strong encryption. It is a good thing for
society; it protects our data across many different vectors, personally
identiﬁable information, our commercial transactions, our ﬁnancial
transactions, our health data, and it protects government information.
Strong encryption is a good thing for society.
But, strong encryption also has costs. It has costs in particular with
respect to public safety because it impacts our investigations. It impacts
our investigations by, in some instances, making evidence or foreign
intelligence information simply unavailable. It’s just not there. We
cannot, and will never, be able to get it. In addition, it has implications
for our ability to conduct effective investigations. So it makes evidence
unavailable, but it also slows us down because we have to try to deal with
this problem; we have to try to ﬁgure out other ways to get at the
evidence or to deal with the threat. It costs more money. It imposes
risks, it increases risks, with respect to the investigation itself because we
have to do riskier things. If we’re trying to keep it quiet and not let the
perpetrator know we are investigating, they might ﬁgure it out because
we’ve done something riskier. It creates risks to our investigators and
undercover agents who might have to be in dangerous situations that
they otherwise wouldn’t ﬁnd themselves in because we could get access
to the person’s electronic communications. We might have to put
human sources in there. We might have to use other techniques that
are, perhaps, more fragile, if you will—
MD: I’m going to want to come back to that.
JB: OK, so we might have to use techniques like that. It creates
signiﬁcant risks for the investigation. It is often argued that we should
adopt or use substitutes for trying to obtain the content of communica
tions, which is really what I’m talking about. Two that come up most
often are legal hacking and metadata analysis. We do both but they are
not a panacea; they do not solve all the problems.
MP: So this is the FBI . . . ?
JB: With a warrant, hacking into a particular device, as opposed to
going to a provider, with an order, and saying “give me all of Mary
DeRosas’ email.” If I can’t do that, if your communications are en
crypted end-to-end and that’s not available to me anymore, one way to
get around it might be to hack your device and try to see what’s
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happening when it’s in the clear or when it’s not been encrypted. That
is possible but those types of solutions are expensive. They are also
fragile because anytime the manufacturer or the software developer
changes something, it could throw the whole solution off. It’s not easy
to do at scale if you have a whole network of people. Metadata analysis is
great; we do it to understand communications networks and social
networks if you will . . .
MD: Can you give me just a sentence or two on what you mean by
that?
JB: An old-fashioned metadata analysis is understanding telephone
records: who’s talking to whom, who else are they talking to, how does
that work, and what do those connections mean? Then you start
looking at who people are communicating with through a variety of
communications platforms, and understanding how that network works.
What ﬁnancial transactions a person engages in, what their movements
are if we can understand those. In other words, understanding not the
content of the communications, but data about the communications.
That’s what metadata is.
MD: There are a lot of people who would argue, I think, that there is
a tremendous amount you can get out of metadata analysis, and maybe
even so much that it makes the content analysis or the content, less
important. What would your response to that be or your reaction to
that be?
JB: Metadata is highly useful, and we use it, there’s no doubt about
that. But it is not everything. It can tell us who’s talking to whom, but it
doesn’t tell us about what. So we might have some leads from some
other source that says these are two “bad guys,” then we see that they
talk a lot to each other, but we don’t know what they’re talking about.
This came up in the threat in Garland, Texas that ended up with the
perpetrator being shot by local law enforcement. We could see in that
instance that the perpetrator was in contact with a terrorist operative
overseas—I can’t remember the exact number— over a hundred times.
But because of the platform that they were using, we couldn’t see what
they are talking about. We knew they were talking, we didn’t know what
they were talking about.
For the law enforcement folks at the scene, something tragic might
have taken place. So that is kind of what I am talking about. Metadata is
good, it is useful, it’s not everything. It doesn’t tell you about the
capabilities, plans, intentions, or activities of the threat actor in the
same way.
We, the FBI, are not trying to impose some solution on society. We
don’t have the solution for this problem and we understand that. We’re
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not trying to force American companies or the American people to
adopt a back door or give us some golden key that undermines cyber
security in some signiﬁcant way—we don’t want that.
MD: There’s no pushing a particular legislative solution to build a
backdoor or anything? Why? I assume it’s because you don’t think it
would be useful—why is that?
JB: So, the concern that we would have about a back door is that it
would be threatening and would undermine even further our cyber
security. Let’s just remember cyber security is not some “perfect” state
we are in today and that the FBI is trying to get people to weaken that
thing which is perfect. It’s not perfect now, so there are risks associated
with it. But we don’t want to make it any worse, that’s for sure. We want
to protect people’s privacy—we want to protect their personal informa
tion. We want to protect their rights of association and free speech. We
need to do that. We want American companies to be competitive and
innovative, especially in the global marketplace in which they must
operate. We want all of those things simultaneously. That is hard to
do—and I don’t think anybody has ﬁgured that out.
There are some interesting ideas that have been put forth. Matthew
Tait on Lawfare had put out the “multiple envelope” concept, we can
talk about it more if you want. There are certain things that are worth
exploring in terms of getting an appropriate balance of all these things.
But I think—as President Obama said—you can’t be absolutist about
these things. We need to ﬁnd something that is an appropriate balance
for American society.
At the end of the day, look, what we’re saying is, we, the FBI, work for
the American people. You have given us the responsibility to protect
you from a range of threats and to enforce the criminal law. So the
question is, what tools do you want us to have? What information do
you want us to have available to us in order to do the job that you’ve
given us? That’s the question. We’re trying to tell people that this is a
problem and we don’t have a solution. But the country has to make
some choices. And if it does nothing, that’s a choice because technol
ogy will continue to evolve, and it changes every day. Encryption is
spreading more and more, and in some ways that’s good, but it presents
more and more challenges for us.
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